Abstract
Introduction
The subject matter of sustainable development has been approached from multidisciplinary perspectives by the academic literature; however, when public policy choices are made the scholarly outputs do not get incorporated in a large number of instances due to many operational constraints including the political economy compulsions. The areas of sustainable development are vast and diverse, often overlapping, nevertheless have long term effects on economic development of both developed as well as on the developing economies, some of these are: institutional environments, governance capacity, public policy choices, policy implementation framework, legal and regulatory regimes, social responsibility, business ethics, human rights and sustainable development, among others.
This narrative illustrates how a decentralized policy and bureaucracy in a country like India deal with myriad problems of resource curse together with attendant consequences, despite the fact that as compared to several developing nations India has a better track record of legislative framework, an experienced bureaucracy and a regulatory framework. There are institutional rigidities and limits of public policy formulation and implementation which adversely affect a diverse range of stakeholders: essentially because economic growth priorities override all feasible considerations of protecting and furthering stakeholder interests. India is not the only state which has undergone such an ordeal, many developing countries have suffered as well from their relative inability to deal with the issues of resource curse; but this case study assumes further significance because based on the actual final decisions a future road map in terms of a realistic public policy both for domestic investors as also foreign investors in extractive industries will be decided.
History-Indian entry
The late 1980s witnessed some fundamental changes like increasing democratization, deregulation and privatization in USA and UK, followed by the 'Washington Consensus which stressed the need for legal, regulatory and institutional framework changes in the developing nations. These trends were further amplified by the East Asian Miracle in the mid 1990s in which the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) developed by way of export led growth model (Page, 1994) . These developments were further reinforced by technology breakthrough and a rapid expansion of cross-border trade and services. Such tends also induced phenomenal growth in the multinational enterprises business by way of international joint ventures and setting up of wholly owned subsidiaries worldwide. Among other reasons, competition among the developing nations for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) became an urgent agenda in rapidly liberalizing developing nations (Oliveira, 2001) . The proposed projects of Vedanta Resources a global player in the mineral market is one of the consequences of the process and content of globalization. India being a resource rich economy in the post reform era tended to invite FDI projects in select sectors and especially in the minerals sector, in view of the constraints of investible funds and technical expertise. The Orissa government in the Eastern India in the 1990s devised ways and means of attracting large FDI projects and negotiated large scale FDI projects: POSCO Steel and Vedanta Resources.
One of the criticisms of the "Washington Consensus" was that in many countries where macro-economic reforms were introduced, they appeared quite unprepared in terms of institutional environments, public policy choices and legal framework to anticipate and deal with the consequences for their economies, let alone society and the environments. In other words, globalization based on such a premise and "one size fits all" agenda across the developing world created certain irreversible consequences for sustainable development.
Vedanta Alumina Ltd -Actual Project Details
Vedanta Resources Plc. is one of the leading diversified natural resources companies in the world, with operations spanning across vast value chain of exploration, asset development, extraction, and processing and value addition. Geographically, the operations are centered in India, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Liberia, Ireland and Australia with employee strength of over 28,000 people. The group has undertaken several Greenfield and brown-field expansion projects throughout the world; and completed capital expansions, involving complex project technologies and large investments, in record time and at significantly lower costs.
Vedanta Alumina Ltd (VAL), a subsidiary of Vedanta UK, proposed development of Aluminum refinery and bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri Hills of Orissa state in India. It is a FTSE 100 listed company. Vedanta, UK has direct controlling stake of 59. adopting global standards in quality, environments, health, and safety systems. The company had won several prestigious awards for energy management, green business, think Odisha leadership, best community development, best HR and award for technology, CSR, among others. The company's sustainability focus was on education, health care, livelihood, safety and health and infrastructure. The company stressed effective community development engagement practices.
Orissa encouraged steel, aluminium and power companies to set up factories and promised them mines to extract iron ore, bauxite and coal like its mineral-rich neighbours Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh but unfortunately like its neighbours, Orissa too witnessed people's resistance to these projects. Besides Vedanta, a number of companies including South Korean steel maker POSCO also faced problems in getting mining leases, environment and forest clearances, and in acquiring land. On July 17, 2013 global steel giant Arcelor Mittal scrapped its Rs 50,000 crore project in Orissa as they failed to acquire land and iron-ore mining blocks for the 12-million-tonne project based on the initial pact signed with the state government in December 2006. The critics argue that promises were made without considering the interest of locals.
Public Policy & Regulatory issues

Ministry of Environment & Forest (MOEF) related issues:
On March 19 th 2003 Sterlite applied for environment clearance for opening the refinery to MOEF. The report stated that the project was neither using any forest area nor there was any forest area in the 10 km radius of the refinery. Based on this report, MOEF granted them environment clearance unaware of the fact that their application for forest clearance with MOEF was still pending. In March 2005, the supreme court of India objected the validity of the environment clearance granted by MOEF and requested the Ministry to withhold the forest clearance till the project was examined by Central Empowered Committee.
In 2002 the Supreme Court allowed mining in the forest areas subject to compliance with the existing laws. As per the Attorney General of India's opinion dated November 23, 2007 "the Court recognized that Vedanta was seeking clearances from the Court even before its proposal was placed before the central government". The Supreme Court granted clearances on August 8, 2008 to the forest diversion of 660.749 ha of forest land for undertaking bauxite mining on the Niyamgirihills in Lanjigarh hence the "the next step would be for the MOEF to grant its approval in accordance with the law."
On August 2010, the state government applied for the final environment clearance to the MOEF but the FAC recommended that the clearance would be granted only after determining the community rights on forest land under the Forest Rights Act 2006. The FAC provided valuable information stating that the project had violated the Forest Rights Act 2006 and Forest (conservation) Act: and Environment (Protection) Act of 1986. The Committee also noted that the bauxite reserves of 72 million tones would last for only four years so the proposed expansion form 1 mtpa to 6mtpa is hardly relevant and if the company the was proposing alternate sources of supply ore what were these sources?
Legal Issues
In June 2003 the state signed afresh MOU with Sterlite for 3 million tons of bauxite mine, a 1 million ton alumina plant, a 75 MW power plant and a 50,000 TPA smelter project. As per the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) appointed by the Supreme Court 58.943 ha of forest land was needed for the refinery which consists of 29 ha of village forest land and 30 ha of reserve forest. The company set up a rehabilitation colony called Vedanta Nagar and by 2004 some families had shifted especially those who opted for one time cash compensation and some others who had little or no options.
In 2004, the state Forest Department issued notice to VAL for encroachment of village forest land to the extent of 4.21 ha and informed the MOEF accordingly. Two activists and a professional also filed a petition before the CEC of the Supreme Court that the VAL had violated the Schedule V of the Indian Constitution resulting into land alienation and destruction of local cultural heritage.
In September 2005 the CEC in their report to the Supreme Court did not recommend clearances to the project so the Supreme Court in February 2006 asked the FAC to prepare a report and submit in three months. Based on the reports of two agencies the FAC recommended clearances to forest land for the project though another case in which the clearance was granted by FAC was under court's review (2006) . As per the CEC the MOEF acted in haste in granting clearances to the project (2007). The Supreme Court asked the CEC and the VAL to propose alternate sites for mining. Power plant commenced in February 2007 and trial run at the refinery started in March 2007 as the Company stated that it was obtaining bauxite from Gujarat and Chhattisgarh on account of pending clearance from the Court.
Ecological and biodiversity: The REIA (Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment) report prepared by Tata AIG Risk Management Services Ltd., Mumbai (TARMS) for SIIL mentions that the estimated bauxite reserve in the lease area was about 73 million tons and the estimated life span of the mining was 23 years. The proposed mining site was located on the top of Niyamgiri hills. The company did not originally disclose that forest land diversion is required. It also did not clearly spell out what were the likely effects of such mining operations on the environment and society. In fact the company claimed that there was no forest land within 10 KM radius of the plant. The CEC made inspections and submitted a report on September 21 2005, and recommended that the clearances should be revoked and mining operations be discontinued. But the Supreme Court granted clearance for forest land diversion in April 2009. This approval generated mass protests from the local people.
The Vedanta Niyamgiri Judgment
The Supreme Court Judgment of April 18 2003 was historic in the sense that Gram Sabha's were empowered to process all claims on forest rights, in particular, religious rights. Once this was done under supervision of a District Judge the report would be sent to the MOEF (Mishra, 2010) . As per May 6, 2016 news report, the Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by the OMC challenging the Gram Sabha decision on refusing permission for bauxite mining on the Nayamgiri hills. The Supreme Court in their order of 2013 had asked the Gram Sabha to decide whether or not this project should go ahead.
Role of Local and National Bodies
Gram Sabha role: In July 2013, the locals were asked to give their views on the project at the Nyamgiri Hills. They told the observer of the Court that the project would destroy God and source of sustenance. This was challenged by the state in the Supreme Court. In April 2013 the Supreme Court ruled that Gram Sabhas will consider claims under FRA and decide if the project infringes on the 'religious and cultural rights' of the local people.
Amnesty international reports:
The salient conclusions of Amnesty International's 2010 and 2011 had concluded that the project involves a diversion of 660 hectares of protected forest land located in the traditional lands of the 8,500 strong Dongria Kondh, a protected Adivasi (indigenous) community and a few other marginalized communities, which will threaten the very survival of the community. The project had undermined the human rights, including right to health and a healthy environment, an adequate standard of living, water, work and food. The report criticized the weakness of India's official bodies to respect and protect the communities' human rights as required under international human rights law.
Recommendations from Amnesty International include provisions for community to access adequate information, comprehensive human rights and environmental impact assessment of the mine plans and any implementation should be undertaken in genuine and open consultation with the local stakeholders. It ordered the suspension of all mine and refinery expansion plans until the human rights issues are properly addressed. N C Saxena Committee report: According to the Saxena committee report , Ecological Costs of Mining operations with the proposed intensity would spread over more than 7 square km and severely disturb the wildlife habitat especially elephants by cutting 1,21,337 trees. The Forest Rights Act could be modified only for conservation of critical wildlife habitats. The Section 5 of the Act vests the Gram Sabhas and the forest dwellers with statutory rights to conserve, protect and manage forests, biodiversity, wildlife, water catchment areas and their cultural and natural heritage.
Observations by OECD Contact Point for Multinational Enterprises:
The UK National Contact Point (NCP) denied Vedanta from engaging Dongria Kondh, an indigenous community in Niyamgiri hills as the mining effects would be detrimental for their health and safety. They further emphasized that Vedanta did not respect the rights of the Dongria Kondh as per India's commitments under the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.
Forest Land -Meant for whose development?
The Centre for Science and Environment, India states that Orissa has claimed maximum amount of forest land for mining operations. Mining of major minerals generated a waste of 1.8 billion tons in 2006 but a proper disposal system had not been put in place. The Report suggested policy changes for the future and recommended that no mining operation should be allowed without the consent of the local people.
As per the India Bureau of Mines (2010), the reserves of bauxite in India account for 3480 million tones with nearly a third i.e., 1068 million tones falling under lease hold areas. NALCO project in Orissa after 25 years of operations had a remaining deposit of over 200 million tones-enough to meet the entire country's demand for another 10 years. Utkal Alumina -a subsidiary of Aditya Birla company Hindalco had a deposit of 195 million tones, which makes a valid case for not disturbing tribals' of Niyamgiri for only 72 million tones.
Some reflections on the Case
The narrative so far has offered a chronology of main landmarks in the journey of this contentious project in Orissa India. The international reactions to the developments were firstly in terms of the investors and financial institutions pulling out their investments in the Vedanata companies. Secondly, international civil society groups and other voluntary organizations like prominent activist and environment groups have supported the battle of the tribal people against the various adverse effects of the VAL operations in the two districts of Orissa. The Church of England reviewed their investment commitment to the company in February 2010 and publicly criticized the company for disrespecting human rights. The Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Dutch PGGM an asset manager also disinvested from the company. These developments did not augur well for corporate reputation and brand equity of the group companies in India.
Learning from the past
The resource extraction projects in the developing countries have become a very complex process because of several legal, regulatory, institutional and governance limitations. The public policy in respect of mining too takes a long time to emerge; meanwhile the damage is done to the society and environments. These countries take relatively a longer time to develop an absorptive capacity to realize the gains from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Particularly in the context of India there is no dearth of experience in the mining in several types of minerals but unfortunately the institutions are not able to derive any worthwhile benefits from the past experiences whether by the local investors or foreign investors. Delays and litigation at the state and national level give a mixed message to the foreign investors. FDI usually flows to the countries with relatively stable and predictable legal and institutional regimes (though often FDI is also attracted by the lax environment enforcement in the host countries). In the anxiety to develop the Orissa state, government invited both foreign as well as domestic investors; but due to the limits of the state public policy and implementation there were inordinate, delays, litigation, and protests. Some of the power and steel projects of domestic investors have taken decades to fructify. Apart from the failure of FDI projects, the state authorities too got into enormous complexities due to the projects-POSCO and Vedanta. On the one hand the center and state have no resource's and technology to explore the minerals in a mineral rich state like Orissa , while on the other when they allowed FDI they were not prepared institutionally, locally hence the promised FDI objectives could not achieved. This case study illustrates the hypothesis that generally democracy attracts FDI; however, there is a caveat: a democracy is as good as its institutions and therefore, where the institutional environments are weak and complex FDI may be difficult to sustain.
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